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Our conversations about human enhancement by technological means are premised on an image of 
technology: what it is, what it can do, by which of its virtues humans can transcend their present 
condition. This image of technology, however, is not technical but social. Günther Anders pointed 
out already that how we valorize technology expresses our sense of deficiency or vulnerability and, 
thus, ex negativo, a conception of a better life, of better humans in a better society (Anders, 1956). 
Half a century later, Sheila Jasanoff foregrounds sociotechnical imaginaries: all the stories of 
technological determinism or enablement, including the visionary expectations of emergent 
technologies, are framed by sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, 2015). These are imaginaries of 
how things can work together, and, when it comes to working together, this might be of individuals 
in a social body or of component parts in technological system.  Not surprisingly, therefore, 1
technical ideas of regularity and efficacy become projected into conceptions of the economy or the 
state, and, inversely, machines can be emblems of cooperation, of a governance of parts. 
 This general consideration becomes salient in current discourse on emerging technologies,     
including its trans- or posthumanist concerns. This discourse tends to overlook that the 
enhancement, empowerment, or transcendence of human nature by technological means is 
predicated on ideas of the enhancement, empowerment, or transcendence of machine nature by way 
 Jasanoff (2015) quotes Charles Taylor on social imaginaries: “I am thinking … of the ways people imagine 1
their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows” (Taylor, 2004, p. 23).
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of sociotechnical imaginaries. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the envisioned technology of 
the future is entirely social and not at all technical. In other words, sociotechnical imaginaries do 
not merely valorize known technologies in certain ways but can form an idealized image of a 
technology that is different and better than any known technology. This is the main thesis of the 
present essay. We learn to view technology in the image of the social by way of conjuring up 
imaginaries of a technology that somehow ceases to be technology-as-we-know-it and becomes 
something else, unheard of, better.  
 A horn of plenty or cornucopia, lamp of Aladdin, Tischlein-deck-dich, or molecular assembler is     
a wish-fulfillment machine that is the work not of engineers but of fairy tales. Only somewhat less 
obvious than these, the soft machines of nanotechnology, their ancestors and distant cousins 
represent not the rationalization of the world but its secular re-enchantment: this strikingly 
nontechnical machinery is wonderful, indeed. The soft machines to be discussed do not constitute a 
technological paradigm that then infiltrates biology or social relations. Instead, they are first of all 
the collective dream of a technology that is unprecedentedly different – almost magically and 
wondrously so – from anything that was thought to be realizable so far. Soft machines are social 
machines insofar as they provide an escape from the limited technology currently in existence, an 
escape into the imaginary world of a technology that offers consolation and hope and is designed to 
establish a kind of peace throughout society. So soft and gentle are these machines that every hard, 
rigid, or constraining technology yields to them completely – including our as yet far too rough-
hewn regulatory policy tools. So soft and gentle are these irreal devices that they are able to cushion 
the impacts of all conflicts of interest and social antagonisms and accommodate all “stakeholders” 
quite comfortably.  
 What will be pursued in the following, then, is not so much how a notion of the technical comes     
to be inscribed in different social domains but rather how a socially powerful notion of the technical 
emerges in the first place. How on earth is it possible – one may end up asking incredulously – for 
an essentially technophobic concept of technology to provide social legitimacy not only to research 
funding but to dreams of escaping our current predicaments? The much diagnosed techno-optimism 
of our age is not simply an expression of confidence in the capacity of future technologies to solve 
all our problems. As Astrid Schwarz has shown in her discussion of “green nanotechnology,” the 
notion of green technology works as a hollow phrase precisely because it lacks technical meaning, 
giving it a highly effective symbolic function in public discourse by way of its ability to 
accommodate various societal visions:  
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The openness of discourse on the environment is used, then, to develop green 
nanotechnology as a space of possibilities compatible with societal wellbeing and 
sustainable in relation to nature. This is where the image of a kind of nanotechnology 
arises that is soft – or at least cautious –, and that reduces stark oppositions. It draws 
together what is thought to be irreconcilable, for example, natural history and physical 
reductionism, application-oriented basic research and scientific progress, the 
preservation of natural and cultural resources, limitation and transgression, scarcity and 
abundance. (Schwarz, 2009, p. 117) 
LEWIS MUMFORD’S MEGAMACHINES 
So much for a programmatic introduction that posits a broadened historical context for our current 
more and less green nanotechnologies along with their soft machines. The next step is to articulate 
the basic argument and provide examples to support it. The argument is that nontechnical social 
machines serve as imaginary ideals of both societal and technological development, that they thus 
become sociotechnical imaginaries.  This may sound somewhat paradoxical, at first, and rather 2
abstract, but it provides a distant echo of Heidegger‘s notion of “enframing” (Gestell) and his 
observation that the essence of technology is not anything technological (Heidegger, 2007, p. 5). 
For Heidegger, this means, first of all, that the essence of technology has nothing to do with means-
ends relations or with technology as a tool or an instrument. References in the following to 
“nontechnical” or even “technophobic” images of technology invoke magical notions of technology. 
According to these magical notions, technology is not primarily an ingenious way of extracting as 
much as possible from the limited resources of a limited world. Instead, nontechnical dreams of 
technology envision that the world could turn out to be limitless, after all, and that technology can 
alter even our conceptions of what is technically possible. While Ernst Cassirer draws a strict 
dividing line between this magical image of technology and the realities of engineering in the 
context of nature and society (1930, pp. 59–60), present-day discourse tends to gloss over this 
difference, especially when the phantasm is evoked of a technology capable of transforming our 
familiar world.  
 Fantasies of technical control assume that technology can advance “without encountering either     
technical delays or sobering human inhibitions,” thereby turning “our dominant technology itself 
into the equivalent of scientific fiction.” About technology as social and scientific fiction, Lewis 
 This conception adds one word to Jasanoff’s definition of sociotechnical imaginaries as ”collectively held, 2
institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared 
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, imagined 
advances in science and technology” (Jasanoff, 2015). To be sure, as Jasanoff points out, existing 
technological infrastructures and established technological achievements can also support sociotechnical 
imaginaries.
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Mumford goes on to say, “The one part of the human personality that so far eludes rational control 
is that which produces these fantasies” (Mumford, 1970, pp. 223 & 290). Writing in the 1960s, 
Mumford gave pointed expression to one paradoxical aspect of his broader technocritical analysis. 
Humans, he maintained, technologically transformed the conditions of their lives by calling upon 
the machine, and they now wish to experience wild, uncontrolled, irrational freedom, they have to 
imagine new humans. To understand what Mumford means by this, it is worth taking a closer look 
at the argument he presents in his book The Myth of the Machine (1967 & 1970).  3
 According to Mumford, “[W]e cannot understand the role that technics has played in human     
development without a deeper insight into the historic nature of humans” (1967, p. 4). Humans 
express through technology their latent potentialities “to fulfill more adequately [their] superorganic 
demands and aspirations” (ibid., p. 8). The needs and desires that are superorganic here are those 
that – conceived in quite traditional philosophical terms – are associated with human freedom. 
Accordingly, the “dominant human trait” is the capacity “for conscious, purposeful self-
identification, self-transformation, and ultimately for self-understanding” (ibid., p. 10). The self-
understanding of humans as historically changeable beings occurs by the very means of technology 
itself, namely, in the encounter with a world that has been deliberately and consciously transformed 
by human hands. And what we become aware of when we see ourselves in our technology is the 
form of societal organization that precedes the reification and the concrete manifestation of 
technology: thanks to a division of labor that is organized in a specific way, that is, with the help of 
technology, humans create for one another a world of things in which they recognize themselves – 
and in which they may be able to transform themselves.  
 In this deliberately created form of organization, the “megamachine” makes its appearance. To     
define the megamachine, Mumford quotes from the standard engineering text of the late 19th 
century, Kinematics of Machinery by Franz Reuleaux (1875), which proved to be extraordinarily 
influential also among philosophers. According to Reuleaux and Mumford, a machine is a 
combination of resistant parts, each of which has a specific function. It operates under human 
control to utilize energy and to perform work (Mumford, 1967, p. 191; cf. Reuleaux, 1875, p. 38). 
Mumford claims that the history of machines that meet this definition goes back at least five 
thousand years. At that time, the machine was not yet visible as a device but existed solely as a form 
of societal organization that laid the foundations for the visible machines of the 19th and 20th 
centuries: “[T]he mechanical agents had first to be ‘socialized’ before the machine itself could be 
fully mechanized” (Mumford ,1967, p. 194).  
 The remainder of this section is based on the discussion in Nordmann, 2008, 53–56.3
!4
 It was this invisible – in a material sense as yet nontechnical – working machine that enabled the     
pyramids to be built five thousand years ago. Though “made of human bone, nerve, and muscle,” 
the components of the machine were, by definition, “reduced to their bare mechanical elements and 
rigidly standardized for the performance of their limited tasks. … The secret of mechanical control 
was to have a single mind with a well-defined aim at the head of the organization, and a method of 
passing messages through a series of intermediate functionaries until they reached the smallest unit” 
(Mumford, 1967, pp. 191–192). For Mumford, this social machine is not the societal manifestation 
of a technical ideal; rather, it exists prior to the construction of the mechanized machine as an 
engineered device. He envisages the free intellectual invention of a form of organization that 
already knows how to utilize mechanical forces before it becomes materialized in a fully 
mechanical labor-saving machine. In the case of the pyramids and a strict, almost totalitarian 
organization of labor, mechanical forces were still socialized rather than mechanized; as such, they 
were part of a societal mechanism rather than a technical one. The model for the interplay between 
cogwheels, screws, winches, and levers comes from the interaction between humans at work.  For 4
Mumford, then, when people recognize themselves in the machine, they are not seeing in it their 
biological or individual nature but the way their society or the megamachine is organized, and, in 
this organization, they themselves are but one system component. And when they adopt the 
perspective of liberty as they view themselves as part of a machine culture, they are able to turn 
against this – only apparently all-encompassing – megamachine by means of conscious self-
identification and self-transformation. 
OTTO MAYR’S CENTRIFUGAL GOVERNOR 
Within the philosophy of technology, Mumford’s is perhaps the most significant and comprehensive 
version of the theory that ideas about technology are constituted by society long before the 
corresponding mechanical device is developed. Moving on from this, we now look at a more 
narrowly defined social machine, introduced here to act as a foil to “soft machines.”  
 As curator of the National Museum of History and Technology in Washington, D.C., historian of     
technology Otto Mayr wanted to write a history of the centrifugal governor, a mechanism for 
automatic regulation that plays a crucial role in the safety of technical systems. Steam engines 
produce pressure in a boiler that then drives a transmission system. High pressure in a boiler always 
 This accords well, then, with Joseph Pitt's definition of technology as "humanity at work" (Pitt, 2011, p. 4
70). However, as opposed to Mumford with his reference to Reuleaux, Pitt does not seek to specify this 
further.
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brings with it the possibility of too much pressure building up, which would lead to an explosion. 
This is where the centrifugal governor comes into play. It consists of a few metal “flyweight” balls 
arranged as a kind of carousel that is propelled by steam pressure. The higher the pressure in the 
boiler, the faster the carousel rotates, and the more quickly it rotates, the stronger the centrifugal 
forces acting on the spinning flyweights: these rise higher and higher as the rotational speed 
increases until they eventually reach a horizontal position. Once the steam pressure in the boiler has 
reached a critical point, and with it the speed of the rotating flyweights so that the latter have nearly 
reached a horizontal position, the governor opens up a valve and steam is able to escape from the 
boiler. This causes the steam pressure to decrease, the carousel to rotate more slowly, and the 
fllyweights to sink back down. The valve now closes again so that only the right amount of steam 
escapes. At this point, the whole process can start over again, with the centrifugal governor acting 
as an automatic system of regulation without which the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution 
would not have been possible – a system of regulation, moreover, that works with a so-called 
feedback loop, as its behavior depends on the system of which it is a part, that is, on the system that 
it is designed to observe and on which it acts in return.  
 When he embarked on writing the history of this system, Mayr made an interesting observation:     
centrifugal governors had been described in a famous list of machines dating from the year 60 CE 
that had been reprinted in the 16th century and had become the blueprint for various mechanical 
showpieces, not least among them a host of clockwork-driven devices. However, well into the 18th 
century, there are no feedback mechanisms to be found in continental Europe but only in Britain 
where the technology had been “cultivated and appreciated.” Why was this the case? Mayr’s search 
for an answer led him to conclude that it was not possible to explain the rejection of these systems 
in continental Europe and their development in Britain by reference to any developmental trajectory 
inherent to the technology itself: 
I had noticed that, in eighteenth century Britain, the principle of the feedback loop had 
come into use not only in practical technology but also in abstract arguments, notably in 
Adam Smith’s economic theory. Assuming that this was not coincidental, I tried to 
establish a connection. I tried to show that the use of the concept in abstract argument 
had been inspired by practical technology. The attempt failed; in the end, I became 
convinced that the connection was not direct but that each phenomenon independently 
was the result of some unknown earlier cause. This suggested that I take a closer look at 
the first question: Why was feedback rejected on the Continent? The question could not 
be answered in terms of developments in practical theory alone. … Perhaps the answer 
was to be sought on another level. Apparently, certain kinds of mechanical inventions 
were immensely popular on the Continent, while others, including feedback devices, 
were not: What made the difference? (Mayr, 1986, p. xvi) 
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 Essentially, Mayr’s book claims that the technical development of clockwork mechanisms and of     
feedback systems was due to interactions “between the political, social, economic, or religious ideas 
dominant in a given society and contemporary preferences and designs of technological 
hardware” (Mayr, 1986, p. xv). Viewed from this perspective, Adam Smith’s economic theory 
precedes the dissemination of the centrifugal governor in mechanical devices not just in 
chronological terms: the invisible hand that balances supply and demand finds its counterpart in the 
automatic action of the mechanism that maintains balance in the steam engine. Thus, Mayr refers to 
feedback mechanisms as “liberal systems,” whereas the clockworks of baroque continental Europe 
reflect an immutable authoritarian system that is hierarchically organized. To imagine a liberal state 
is to promote self-regulation; accordingly, liberal economic theories appeared prior to technical 
refinements of the governor – which, in turn, enabled the governor to become a kind of technical 
metaphor for the modern state.  
The steam engine governor probably did more than any other agent to publicize the 
concept of self-regulation among engineers and the general population. The Watt steam 
engine was greeted as a machine of revolutionary importance and as the herald of a new 
age. No one would miss an opportunity to see this wonder in operation, and few who 
saw it would have failed to inquire about the purpose of those rapidly rotating 
centrifugal weights that were mounted conspicuously over the machine. To explain the 
concept of self-regulation, from that time on, one only had to point out the steam engine 
governor. When Norbert Wiener in 1947 christened his new science of cybernetics, he 
was expressly paying tribute to what he considered the earliest cybernetic device; the 
word governor is derived via the Latin gubernator, from the Greek [for] steersman. 
(Mayr, 1986, pp. 194–195). 
A modern-day observer looking at the steam engine designed to operate the water fountain in the 
royal gardens of Potsdam, for example, will see – despite its rather weak performance by today’s 
standards – a technological miracle housed in an exotic temple, high up on which the bronze 
governor sits enthroned, a polished and gleaming wise steersman or navigator. And by no means 
accidentally, atop the regulator as an emblem of enlightened governance sits the crowned Prussian 
eagle. Likewise, to the present day, the art of government in a liberal state relies on a regulatory 
system. The material quality of products, the amount and composition of exhaust fumes, and the 
ingredients in food items are all subject to regulation, in many cases enshrined in law: there are 
established routines, if not automatic procedures, for observation, and corrective measures are taken 
once a defined threshold is transgressed. This system is motivated by the notion of balancing the 
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innovative strength of the market against consumers’ safety needs: if anything bad were to happen, 
the measure kicks in and balance is quickly restored.  5
 Mumford’s working machine and Mayr’s centrifugal governor have served as examples to show     
that societies imagine technologies even before the latter actually exist in the form of specific 
devices or technically realized machines. These machines are at first completely social, 
materializing only at a later time; they are not inspired by technology. And it can be said that the 
regulatory control system with its automatic feedback mechanism and its balancing function was a 
model for the development of society and technology alike.  6
  As complex as the interplay may be between ideas of society and technical devices, it has given    
rise to a highly tangible technological world. Not only are there now very real factory floors on 
which work machines are organized into production lines, but also boiler safety technologies with 
their theoretical underpinnings and engineering practices. However, a more far-reaching claim was 
put forward at the beginning of this chapter, namely, that societies also find orientation in a quite 
nontechnical, irreal idea of technology. This will be shown in reference to soft machines, but this 
discussion, too, can be prepared by way of historical precedent. Jessica Riskin describes a short-
lived fanciful technology that briefly appeared during the second half of the 18th century and that 
foreshadows a similarly precarious development in the current age of soft machines. 
 Only recently in Brussels, window-shoppers might have encountered a rather large cat stretched     
out luxuriantly on its back amid piles of Belgian chocolates. Pretty soon they would have realized 
that the cat is a mechanical doll performing certain cat-like movements. It strokes its whiskers with 
its paw as a contented swell rises and falls across its thick underbelly. Jessica Riskin wrote a history 
of such devices, and, in her words, this doll functions analogically. Inside it is a kind of clockwork 
that functions like a mechanical model, and that is set up to represent certain visible signs or 
movements of a cat. The very fact that we recognize it as a toy and understand the representational 
 The governor or cybernetic controller of the steam engine is not only a cipher of the “first industrial 5
revolution” and not only the epitome of the technocratic “control and regulation” paradigm that was 
criticized by Heidegger and Marcuse. It continues to be influential in conceptions of “governance beyond the 
state” where it refers to self-regulatory mechanisms for the reconciliation of interests or the balancing of 
goods. Lösch et al., 2009, ask whether perhaps a social machine other than the centrifugal governor might be 
required as a political model – one more appropriate to current modes of technoscientific and industrial 
production. The question is all the more urgent in light of the fact that the development of soft machines in 
nanotechnology, synthetic biology, information and communications technologies, and climate engineering 
eludes classical regulatory procedures. A critique of the governance concept on this basis can be found in the 
final section below.
 At this point, it would be instructive to consider, for purposes of comparison, a perpetual motion machine 6
(or rather the impossibility of such a machine) as a fictitious technology that served as an organizational 
form for technology and society and equally for science and industrial production procedures; see 
Rabinbach, 1992.
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character of the mechanical model makes it clear that this is an instance of a piece of hardware that 
technically mediates the gap between a real biological cat and the mechanics of its appearance. This 
hardware has little in common with the internal living essence of an actual cat, except that it is able 
to reproduce certain visible signs, albeit using quite different means than those of a real cat. 
According to Riskin, there were legions of such automata in existence in the 17th and especially the 
19th centuries. However, between 1730 and 1790, the focus was on other constructions, which 
Riskin, in contrast to analogical hardware, describes as wetware – thereby using a very 
contemporary term from artificial intelligence research and biocybernetics. 
 Riskin illustrates the difference by describing various writing automata, that is, life-like dolls that     
move a feather quill across a sheet of paper. In the 17th and 19th centuries, such automata made it 
seem as if they were writing, moving the quill in characteristic manner through the air above the 
paper. In the 18th century, however, the aim was to make the apparatus actually write for real. And 
indeed a writing figure originating from the workshop of Jaquet-Droz was able to write up to 40 
programmable words. The inside of this figure looked different as well: 
The Jaquet-Droz automata do not just carry out the processes of writing, drawing, and 
playing music, they are also anatomical and physiological simulations. Their skeletal 
structures were likely designed with the help of the village surgeon. Both the Lady-
musician and the Draughtsman also breathe. The Draughtsman periodically blows the 
charcoal dust from his paper and surveys his work, and the Lady-musician sighs in time 
to the music. Her breathing was what spectators most often commented upon. It made 
her seem not only alive, but emotional. She appeared moved by the music she played. 
(Riskin, 2003, p. 102) 
So these are not simply mechanisms that model and represent certain behaviors analogically; they 
are simulations of living behavior – extending as far as the birth machines of Madame du Coudray, 
which, constructed from pelvic bone, fabric, leather, and moist sponges, served quite literally as 
wetware so that midwives could rehearse something akin to the process of birth. That these 
simulations were crude and clumsy does not defeat their purpose – these 18th-century machines are 
very much like current attempts to learn from simulations rather than from analogical models.  7
Today‘s biocyberneticians, intelligence and behavioral researchers describe the organic connections 
in the human brain as “wetware” in contrast to the hardware of a computer. To be sure, one can use 
the latter to imitate intelligent behaviors or thought processes in a technological medium, yet the 
fact that an analogy must first be established between organic and electrical processes signifies a 
 Riskin’s distinction cannot be understood from the vantage point of the familiar contrast between digital 7
and analog technologies: her "simulations" are analogical devices as well. Her contrast between simulation 
and analogy is more like the distinction between icon and index, where the iconic is based on the immediate 
participation of the sign in the signified (simulation) and an index corresponds to the two-place relation 
between the representation and that which is represented (analogy).
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gap between model and world, construction and reality. In the simulation of living processes, no 
such gap should even appear. Thus, a specific demand for knowledge calls for an intimate proximity 
to things. And this epistemological requirement entails an expectation of the machinery of 
simulation that this technology cannot actually fulfill.  
 The automata of the 18th century exhibit clearly how far they fall short of this unrealistic     
expectation. They are unable to simulate living processes in such a way as to generate theoretical 
insights or practical skills regarding the physiology of humans and animals in an unmediated way, 
directly from beholding the machine. The question arises, though, whether today’s simulations have 
really come much farther than that or whether they still gesticulate clumsily toward an unachievable 
ideal of technology – an ideal device that has been assigned a definite role in the research process 
and that already functions as a public object of fascination.  Riskin comments on this: 8
“Wetware” … is the expression of a particular moment, the turn of the twentieth to the 
twenty-first century. The neologism voices one of the organizing ambivalences of the 
current moment: we believe that the processes of life and consciousness are essentially 
mechanistic and can therefore be simulated, and yet we are equally firmly persuaded 
that the essences of life and consciousness will ultimately be beyond the reach of 
mechanical reproduction. (2003, p. 97) 
As described by Riskin, this ambivalence is an expression of a profound confusion and perplexity 
that would leave unjustified any expectation of a kind of technology that somehow transcends its 
mechanistic origins. The simulations that had made an appearance in the 18th century disappeared 
again in the 19th because the idea of such a technology could not be developed coherently; and they 
are now returning because, in the transition from the 20th to the 21st century, we find ourselves 
once again confused and perplexed. This, of course, raises the further question of why these two 
historical moments, in particular, should be characterized by such confusion and perplexity.  
 Riskin picks up on this question – “Why were the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries periods     
of analogy, and the late eighteenth and late twentieth centuries periods of simulation?” (2003, p. 
118) – and suggests an answer. Analogies are employed when people consider what machines are 
and find that animals are a lot like them and can be described in the language of machinery. In 
contrast, simulations respond to perplexity when people are not entirely sure what animals are, or 
what machines can be, and seek to find out about both by trying to build an animalmachine. With 
their animalmachine, then, the researchers of the 18th and 21st centuries are imagining a technology 
without knowing whether it can even exist, that is, whether its very idea may turn out to be 
 The currently most prominent example of this is the Human Brain Project and its American counterpart. 8
The project's aim is to construct a map of the brain and an integrated model of its functioning at the scale 
very nearly of 1:1. It is quite clear what its scientific contribution will be: the funding is in place, and public 
expectations are set. It is unclear, however, whether it could ever become technically feasible.
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incoherent. As such, these machines are an especially vivid example of the fact that technological 
ideals can be, as it were, nontechnical, indeed almost antitechnical: 
The beginnings of the Industrial Revolution and the beginnings of the Information 
Revolution were both periods of extreme fluidity in people’s understandings of what 
machines were – and indeed in the nature of machines. Once the industrial period was 
fully under way, manmade machinery and its relations to living creatures stabilized, 
replacing the fluidity required by a simulation with two terms that were, for the moment, 
fixed: “life” and “mechanism.” Only when the Information Revolution introduced a new 
kind of machinery did this fixity give way to a new fluidity, and the possibility of using 
machinery to simulate life again seemed intriguing. In other words, the modern makers 
of automata that see, hear, and feel in fact have a great deal in common with the 
eighteenth-century makers of automata that breathed, spoke, and defecated. They too 
use machines to simulate life precisely because their conception of machines is no better 
established than their understanding of life. (Riskin, 2003, pp. 118–119) 
With regard to the claim being developed here, then, one might say that societies hope for 
orientation from merely imagined technology because they understand neither themselves nor 
technology and because they are troubled, fascinated, and perplexed all at once by the limits and 
possibilities of technology and by the future promise of an unprecedented new and different 
technology. This perplexity characterizes the life–simulating wetware of the pre- and postindustrial 
age and also the “soft” social machines imagined in our own times. 
RICHARD JONES’S SOFT MACHINES 
The succession of historical examples has now arrived in the present and affords a view of 
nanotechnology as a prime example of so-called emerging technologies. These technologies feed 
the hope – against our better judgment – for solutions to nearly all pressing problems. They promise 
cures for cancer and resource saving, energy-efficient products, interventions in the climate, and the 
synthesis of novel biological organisms. Nanotechnology is an especially interesting case because at 
its beginnings stood the idea of an unprecedented machinery, and, since its beginnings, the possible 
reality or likely irreality of these machines were at issue. Anyone who knows anything about 
nanotechnology has most likely heard of things called "molecular assemblers" or “nanobots,” which 
may either exist sooner or later or else are completely impossible. These are the devices on which 
the allure of nanotechnology depends entirely.  9
 The fact that the allure of nanotechnolgy depends entirely on this dream is confirmed by our sobered 9
awakening. As soon as the promise of these machines vanished from the generally accepted list of 
nanotechnological promises, nanotechnology lost its magic spell of fascination. It is now an R&D trajectory 
like any other and is for the most part normalized – no longer a matter of molecular machines and atomic 
precision but merely of chemically produced nanomaterials. Collective dreams of novel machinery are 
nowadays projected upon synthetic biology.
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 The highly differentiated nanomachine discourse cropped up in many different areas of society,     
including cultural and social science as well as philosophical analysis, but cannot be discussed here 
(see Drexler 2003a, 2003b; Lösch, 2007; Myers 2008; Nerlich, 2005; Smalley, 2003a, 2003b). 
While Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Xavier Guichet (2007) draw an analytic distinction 
between Cartesian, complex and concrete machines, the following takes as its starting point the 
much-discussed book Soft Machines by physicist Richard Jones (2004) with its distinction between 
hard and soft machines. Interestingly, Jones’s soft machines are not based on any prior 
technological model. He introduces them not because he sees an already advancing technical 
development that demands our attention, but because only the conception of “soft machines” lends 
meaning to the claim by nanotech visionaries that there might one day be molecular machines. 
Since molecular machines are not compatible with familiar technical paradigms, a new, quite 
different kind of technology – wet and soft and modeled on biological processes – needs to be 
imagined on which these machines could, in principle, be based. Jones presents all this with great 
intelligence and care – he knows exactly what he is doing. As a physicist, he does not assume any 
obligation to prove the technical feasibilty of the soft machines he conceptualizes. Indeed, even 
where it explores the idea of what a molecular machine would have to be from the point of view of 
physics and biology, his book is ultimately one on the relations between nanotechnology and 
society.  
 The question of nanomachinery is salient, according to Jones and numerous other researchers,     
because it is on this question that societes might refuse to accept nanotechnology's beneficial nature. 
An understanding of "soft machines," Jones argues, provides a necessary corrective to dangerously 
simple-minded ideas about the ways in which nanotechnology will disrupt social relations. Those 
who speak of “molecular machines,” “nanobots,” “ assemblers,” and the like are aligning 
themselves with the visionary rhetoric that was initially introduced by Eric Drexler. According to 
this rhetoric, nanotechnology enables such precise control over individual atoms and molecules that 
it becomes possible to construct tiny, scaled-down, otherwise ordinary machines that will perform 
work, for example, by fabricating artefacts, repairing human cells or clearing arteries. For Jones, 
this notion is dangerously misleading for various reasons. Given that it is not scientifically credible 
(Jones, 2004; Smalley, 2003a, 2003b), it gives nanotechnology a bad reputation and undermines all 
its promises. And even though it is not scientifically credible, it might, nonetheless, trigger 
irrational fears of uncontrollable nanobots.  
 That this notion lacks credibility, however, opens up the possibility of a thought experiment –     
one that leads away from the idea of scaled-down conventional machinery at the molecular level 
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and that imagines instead an unconventional kind of machine that, although having fine scientific 
credentials, is beyond technical reach. Jones asks what kinds of machines could perform work at the 
nanoscale. These would be molecules among molecules in the bloodstream, for instance. A machine 
of this sort would have to know how to utilize the particular conditions of a world in which 
gravitational forces are practically absent and where Brownian motion dominates. A machine that 
was designed according to principles familiar from the macroscopic world would stand no chance at 
all against Brownian motion. Instead, what would be needed is a biologically soft machine, for 
example, a viral or sperm-like machine that is adapted to its environment, that allows itself to be 
driven by its environment, and whose proper functioning is guaranteed by its environmental 
conditions. In this way – and to counter the scientifically noncredible nanobot – Jones brings into 
play a scientifically respectable, albeit merely hypothetical, machine that appears to take its cue 
from political philosopher Ernst Bloch. Decades ago Bloch dreamt of technology that was allied 
with nature to produce an "unprecedented insertion" and the "building of human work into the work 
of nature" (Bloch, 1973, p. 817; cf. also Simondon’s “concrete machines” [1958]). In what sense 
"soft machines" can even be considered “machines” in the first place is not at all clear; neither is it 
clear whether they can ever be realized in technical terms. Nonetheless, Jones's soft machines 
promise something new that eludes the opposition of natural and social relations. Instead, these 
machines are integrated into the physical and social dynamics of human affairs and natural 
processes – they make for a sensitive, considerate, conducive, friendly technology.  
 It may come as no surprise, then, that physicist and nano researcher Richard Jones not only     
wrote this book but subsequently became one of the most prominent and effective nanotechnology 
communicators in Britain. And that is saying something: influenced by critical scholarship in the 
field of science and technology studies, Britain has rejected the simple model according to which 
the communication of scientific ideas serves primarily to promote their acceptance. Here, too, what 
is intended is “unprecedented insertion” – governance as building or designing human work into the 
work of science and technology (Kearnes et al., 2006). The state should no longer be conceived as a 
hard machine to whose regulatory agencies citizens address their concerns merely by submitting 
petitions and inquiries, or as a machine with a rigid funding mechanism that is tied to immutable 
criteria of scientific quality and economic profitability. Rather, processes of technological 
development should prove to be gentle and soft, open to collective design, accommodating and 
trustworthy. In this sense, Richard Jones filled his role of designated ombudsman for 
nanotechnology in an exemplary manner – exemplary not only on account of his analyses, which 
are readily accessible, carefully differentiated, clearly understandable, and often funny, and not only 
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because he was crucially involved in public consultations aimed at establishing research priorities. 
Jones also filled his role in exemplary fashion in that he engaged in dialogue with scholars in the 
social sciences and the humanities (for example, Jones, 2011). As a representative or model citizen 
of socially constituted research on emerging technologies (“mode 2 knowledge production”; cf. 
Nowotny et al., 2004), Jones constructed two kinds of soft machinery and two technologies so 
gentle as to be unreal. His biologically inspired nanoscale machine and the participatory governance 
machine mutually inform one another, since both share in the social imaginary of a never-to-be-
realized but altogether gentle and accommodating technology.  
 Jones’s soft or biological machines will not be considered as machines by some for the simple     
reason that the blurring of the organic and the mechanical constitutes a category mistake – 
especially if to the organic is attributed something akin to emergence or spontaneity and, thus, 
something that eludes predictive control. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, in particular, has emphasized that 
nanotechnological research programs appear to be dedicated to the paradoxical task of controlling 
the uncontrollable. In the appopriately muddled words of an anonymous nano researcher:  
The problem is the illusion of control – what we want to do is reverse engineer. We 
harness self-assembly in a non-linear way to get what we want. To do this at the 
nanoscale will be a big breakthrough because we can then start to control things, put 
them in compartments and let them evolve. We don’t need the illusion of control. We let 
the system select what it needs according to its local environment. We can’t be an 
engineer at that level if we want to use bottom up. Nature takes this approach and it 
works very well. (Quoted in Macnaghten & Kearnes, 2007, p. 17) 
The paradoxical brief of controlling without control appears here under the heading of “bottom-
up engineering” (implying the use of self-organizing processes such that technological systems 
can grow and need not be constructed), but it comes also under the heading of “soft machines.” 
Self-organization, contends Dupuy and herein echoes the anonymous researcher, is 
fundamentally contrary to the art of engineering, and he notes that a dynamic that is sometimes 
labeled as nonlinear dynamics and sometimes as chaos theory contradicts the idea of reliably 
functioning technological systems. Engineers, he says, surely have no intention of allowing 
their constructions to surprise them and surely will not build technical systems so complex that 
they feature catastrophic tipping points (Dupuy, 2007).  
SOFT GOVERNANCE IN A PLASTIC WORLD 
The opposite of realism, so it is sometimes said, is not utopian but wishful thinking (for example, 
Geuss, 2010). Thus, the genie of the lamp or the perpetual motion machine is no utopia either but 
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rather a wish-fulfilling machine – not much different from the steam engine's regulator whose art of 
governance transforms individuals’ interests into the common good, and not much different either 
from the intelligence of an organized division of labor that allocates each individual a place in the 
order of things. Accordingly, one could go on from here to produce a critique of the discourse on 
machine enhancement and attendant concepts of a nontechnical technology that reflect wishful 
thinking but have no technological precedents. This would be a critique of taking these concepts too 
seriously, either in funding decisions or in public deliberations. It would seek to expose a confused 
state of debate.  10
 If, however, ours is an age in which we neither know what humans are and what they can do nor     
what machines are and what they are capable of, and if we are unsure about the limits of 
technology, there is no easy way of dismissing wishful thinking and the conception of 
unprecedented machines. By understanding them as sociotechnical imaginaries of how things might 
work together, they can neither be valorized for their normative expectation of a better world nor be 
dismissed as illusory and misleading – the conception of sociotechnical imaginaries cuts across the 
distinction between utopian and wishful thinking.  In sociotechnical imaginaries, historical 11
experience appears in the horizon of hope and destiny, of what might be possible and what should 
be necessary. As such, these imaginaries are saturated with experience and "false consciousness," 
but, in irreal conceptions of unprecedented machines, they also create images of peaceful 
accommodation, the end of politics, or the infinite plasticity of the natural and social world. These 
images need to be recognized rather than debunked, rendered amenable for public deliberation. 
Irony and caricature can help, if only to loosen the hold on the imagination of human enhancement, 
for example. When the idea of perfecting human nature is discussed alongside that of enhancing 
machine nature and of enhancing material nature (Nordmann, 2010), these various ideas will gain 
mutual support by referring to a shared historical reality but, by the same token, will also appear 
more precarious – symptoms perhaps of normative uncertainty and cultural instability.  
 It would be a major surprise if it actually proved possible to build transparent wish-fulfillment     
machines that offered no resistance, that exerted control without exerting control, and that 
 I have gone this route in an earlier version of the present paper (Nordmann, 2014).10
 According to Jasanoff, “Sociotechnical imaginaries occupy the theoretically uninscribed space between the 11
idealistic collective imaginations identified by social and political theorists and the politically neutered, 
hybrid networks or assemblages with which STS scholars tend to describe reality.” These are visions, then, 
not of a future that departs from the present but of an idea of the future that reinforces the present. As such, 
“ [u]nlike mere ideas and fashions, sociotechnical imaginaries are collective, durable, capable of being 
performed” (Jasanoff, 2015). In the remainder of this conclusion, it will be shown in which sense even 
Jones’s soft machines are collective and durable imagined technologies and that they are capable of being 
performed.
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seamlessly expressed the order of nature and a social world.  At the same time, it is no surprise that 12
the notion of controlling the uncontrollable inhabits people’s imaginations and informs the 
machinery of social life. The very idea of technical control over historically contingent, dynamic 
processes offers the promise that politics need no longer be an art but can reliably manufacture 
social harmony and consensus. Indeed, this is what an imagined technology can facilitate and 
enable – the depoliticization of politics. In the nonlocal public sphere of soft law, soft regulation, 
and soft governance, there is no hard machinery of thresholds and regulatory interventions. Its 
social machinery seeks to exploit the effortless compulsion from self-organizing, almost organic 
processes of growth.  13
 If one wanted to cite specific reasons for the emergence of such a governance conception of     
politics and technology, one could do worse than consider Jessica Riskin’s diagnosis of our time. 
She has postulated a connection between the fascination with technical simulations of organic 
processes and people’s sense of perplexity regarding the possibilities and limitations of technology. 
This perplexity can be interpreted as a response to the general notion that there are no limits to the 
world’s malleability – a notion for which nanotechnology and synthetic biology are only the most 
recent examples). Indeed, this malleable world appears to be dematerialized to such an extent that it 
has run out of ways to resist technological intervention (Bensaude-Vincent, 2004). The nonphysical, 
soft social machine, thus, embodies a broadened conception of design that draws together the work 
of developers and users; technicians, engineers; and scientists; consumers and citizens – if everyone 
is invited to contribute to the shaping of an infinitely plastic world, conflict will evaporate and 
environmental problems, for example, “will take care of themselves” (Nordmann & Schwarz, 
2010). Mumford, in particular, elaborated the historical significance of a technology that initially 
existed only in the imagination. This is what we are seeing also today: the soft governance model of 
a collective social experiment with new technologies suggests the emergence of a social order in 
which producers and developers voluntarily agree to be accountable, in which consumers willingly 
act as guinea pigs, in which analytic expertise is spread among all participating citizens, in which 
monitoring by state agencies is replaced by permanent vigilance distributed over an indefinite 
 Eric Drexler’s “universal assemblers” were quite explicitly to be wish-fulfilling machines and, as such, 12
were able to influence the early years of nanotechnology research in a decisive way. The dream of being able 
to translate mere thinking into a functioning machine makes so-called mind-machine interfaces so 
fascinating – even if they can only ever be brain-machine interfaces and for their functioning require the 
power of concentration rather than thinking alone.
 One example of this is the social scientific research conducted to accompany scientific research projects. It 13
recruits and enrolls a critical public in an uncontrolled participatory experiment, aimimg to achieving the 
self-organization of consensual cooperation in a communal future-oriented project beneath the mantle of 
“developing nanotechnology in a responsible way” (Jasanoff, 2002; Ferrari & Nordmann, 2009).
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number of actors. Subsequently, conflicts of interest beome backgrounded in the discourse of 
responsibility, while “ethics” serves as an international lingua franca. All this, at any rate, is part of 
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